August 4, 2026
\nDjango 5.2.17 fixes one security issue with severity “high”, two security\nissues with severity “moderate”, and one security issue with severity “low” in\n5.2.16.
\nSpatial lookups allowed str and dict lookup values to be passed to\nGDALRaster when they represented rasters.\nDepending on the raster driver, this could write a file to disk (in some cases\nenabling remote code execution) or issue a network request as the Django\nprocess user. Because the admin changelist permits filtering via\nlookup_allowed(), the flaw was reachable\nby staff users with view permission on any registered model containing a\nspatial field.
The following types are now disallowed by spatial lookups:
\ndict
A str that is not a valid\nGEOSGeometry, e.g. a serialized dictionary
This is a backward incompatible change. As a reminder, all untrusted user input\nshould be validated before use. For that reason, assignments to model fields\nare unaffected and still accept these input types.
\nFor guidance on how to keep using these types in spatial lookups, on validating\nuntrusted input, and on further security considerations, see\nraster security considerations.
\nThis issue has severity “high” according to the Django security policy.
\ncheck_for_language()Link to this heading#check_for_language() was subject to a potential\ndenial-of-service attack when checking many distinct, very long language codes.\nEach code was used as a key in an in-memory cache, consuming process memory.
The language value reaches this function through the\ndjango.views.i18n.set_language() view (not active by default) from POST\ndata. Since request data is limited by DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE\nand the cache is configured to store a maximum number of entries, the memory\nthat could be consumed was bounded.
To mitigate this vulnerability, language codes longer than 500 characters are\nnow rejected before the cached lookup.
\nThis issue has severity “low” according to the Django security policy.
\nGEOSGeometry was subject to a potential\ndenial-of-service attack when provided deeply nested GEOMETRYCOLLECTION\nobjects, leading to a segmentation fault in GEOS. A maximum depth of 198\nGEOMETRYCOLLECTIONs is now enforced for the well-known text (WKT) format,\nand a maximum number of 198 GEOMETRYCOLLECTIONs in total (breadth and\ndepth) is enforced for well-known binary (WKB).
Lookups against spatial fields and the\nGeometryField form field were also affected.
The limit can be customized through the new max_geom_collections argument,\navailable on GEOSGeometry, the\nform field,\nand the model field. The limit\nis not applied to GeoJSON inputs, as they were parsed by GDAL and are not\naffected.
This issue has severity “moderate” according to the Django security\npolicy.
\nURLField values in the adminLink to this heading#The admin renders URLField values as clickable links\non changelist views and read-only fields. The link was generated without\nvalidating the value as a safe URL, so a stored value using a potentially\ndangerous scheme was rendered as a link.
URLField values shown via display_for_field are now validated using\nURLValidator before a link is rendered, and\ndisplayed as plain text if validation is failed.
This issue has severity “moderate” according to the Django security\npolicy.
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